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Abstract
This paper starts with a discussion of the various aspects of acc untability of central banks. On the basis of
this discussion we construct an indicator for accountability for 16 central banks, including the European
Central Bank. It is shown that the degr e of accountability differs considerably and that the ECB has a rather
low score. The indicator is used to examine the relationship between central bank independence and account-
ability. It is concluded that although there appears to be a negative relationship between independence and
accountability, this does certainly not imply that a central bank cannot both be independent and accountable. 
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"Economists and practitioners in the area of monetary policy generally
believe that the degree of independence of the central bank from other
parts of government affects the rates of expansion of money and credit and,
through them, important macroeconomic variables, such as inflation and the
size of the budget deficit." (Cukierman et al., 1992, pp. 353-354). 
"Monetary policy is a key detrminant of the economy's macro economic
performance. ... That this key determinant of what happens to society ...
should be so removed from control of the democratically elected officials
should at least raise questions." (Stiglitz, 1997, p. 19).
1. Introduction
As follows from the first citation above, nowadays is it widely believed that a high level of central bank
independence (CBI) coupled with some explicit mandate for the bank to restrain inflation are important
institutional devices to assure of price stability. It is thought that an independent central bank can give
full priority to low levels of inflation, whereas in countries with a more dependent central bank other
considerations (notably, re-election perspectives of politicians and a low level of unemployment) may
interfere with the objective of price stability (Cukierman, 1992). In other words, CBI makes a monetary policy
directed towards low levels of inflation more credible. Indeed, there is quite some evidence for a negative
relationship between central bank independence and inflation (see Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996 for a review).
This evidence generally consists of regressions using proxies for CBI based on the statutes of the central
bank. Popular as the view referred to above may be, the concept of central bank independence has always had its
critics.  As follows from the second citation above, one potential objection towards a completely independent1
central bank is lack of accountability. Indeed, Cukierman (1994) argues that CBI reduces the credibility
problem at the cost of placing monetary policy in the hands of unelected officials. According to Cukierman this
becomes more problematic in times of large unexpected economic shocks. Levy (1995, p. 191) goes further and
even argues that "democracy requires that central bank independence be limited so that the makers of monetary
policy cannot stray far from the will of the people as embodied in their duly elected r presentatives." We do
not share this view. Where it, in our point of view, comes down to is to which extent there is a mechanism to
make sure that the central bank behaves optimal from a welfare point of view. As Fischer (1994, p. 293) puts it:
"An important reason to expose central bankers to elected officials is that, just as the latter may have an
inflationary bias, the former may easily develop a deflationary bias. Shielded as they are from public
opinion, cocooned within an anti-inflationary temple, central bankers can all too easily deny that cyclical
unemployment can be reduced by easing monetary policy". Or, in the words of Briault et al. (1996, pp. 18-19):
"Delegation of power to an unelected authority might be interpreted as a dilution of democracy: an empowered,
but unaccountable, central bank gives rise to a `democratic deficit'. Democracy is a compelling - if
3
ultimately intangible - argument for accountability. .... Fischer uses precisely this point to pinpoint a
potential danger facing the Bundesbank - the desire to target inflation below its socially optimal level. And,
of course, such a danger then applies equally to the European Central Bank, should it come into play".  Briault2
et al. conclude that there is a problem of a democratic deficit, especially if the central bank is given goal
independence, i.e. the scope for the central bank to set the ultimate goals of monetary policy.
Indeed, the basic argument for the democratic accountability of central banks is that delegation of
powers to unelected officials can only be acceptable in a democratic society if central banks are one way or
another accountable to democratically elected institutions. Briault et al. (1996) even consider it in terms of
fundamental political or even ethical demand for democracy. Still, one should not conclude that delegation of
power to unelected officials in itself lacks democratic legitimation. In the case of central banks, such a
legitimation can be found in the legal basis of the central bank, which generally constitutes an act of
Parliament. Yet, this one time act of legitimation cannot replace mechanisms of democratic accountability.
An important issue is the relationship between accountability and central bank independence. It is
very often thought that an independent central bank cannot be very accountable and vice versa. However,
according to Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) such a trade-off does not exist in the longer ru . A central bank,
continuously conducting a policy which lacks broad political support, will sooner or later be overridden.
Recently, Nolan and Schaling (1996) have come up with another view. They argue that for a given target level of
inflation the optimal degree of central bank accountability (in their definition) is higher the lower is the
degree of central bank independence. Using an indicator of central bank accountability as recently developed
by Briault et al. (1996) and the Eijffinger-Schaling index for independence, Nolan and Schaling (1996) report
a significant negative relationship between central bank accountability and central bank independence. De
Haan (1997) shows, however, that if the Grilli-Tabellini-Masciandaro and Cukierman indicators for CBI are
used, this relationship vanishes. So the conclusion of Nolan and Schaling that accountability may serve as a
partial substitute for independence is not very well founded.3
This paper has several purposes. First, we provide a definition of accountability and its various
aspects. Second, on the basis of this definition we construct an indicator for central bank accountability for
16 central banks (including the ECB) based on information which relates to the situation in 1997. Third, we use
this indicator to examine the relationship between CBI and accountability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers our definition of accountabil-
ity. Section 3 discusses how the economic literature to date has dealt with the issue of accountability. The
fourth section presents our indicator f accountability, while section 5 analyses the relationship between
our indicator and the Eijffinger-Schaling indicator for CBI. The final section offers some concluding
comments.
2. The concept of accountability
The Oxford English Dictionary defines accountable as "obliged to give a reckoning or explanation for one's
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actions; responsible". The latter is defined as: "legally or morally obliged to take care of something or to
carry out a duty; liable to be blamed for loss or faillure". So it is clear that accountability is more than
just "the degree to which central banks explain or make visible their policies to Parliament and/or the public"
(De Beaufort and Hoogduin, 1994, p. 81). The definition of Demertzis et al. (1998) focus on performance; they
define accountability as meaning that policy makers can and will be held to account for the economic
performance of the targets in their care, i.e. policy makers will be held responsible for how close the
indicators of economic performance come to the target values set.
In our view the concept of central bank accountability has three main features:
1. decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary policy;
2. transparency of actual monetary policy;
3. who bears final responsibility with respect to monetary policy.
In a democratic society, elected politicians should decide on the ultimate objectives of monetary policy
because they have democratic legitimation. It is questionable whether it is legitimate in a democratic system
to leave the decisions on the objectives of monetary policy in the hands of an independent institution, which
is not subject to elections or ministerial responsibility. Indeed, the Roll Report (p. 3) concludes that "in a
democracy, a central bank cannot both be independent and free to determine its own objectives". Furthermore,
these objectives should be clarly defined. For instance, the primary objective of the ECB as described in
primary Community law is to maintain price stability. At the same time, the ECB has also, without impairing
this primary objective, to support genral economic policies in the Community. Although many central bankers
would consider an inflation rate between zero and two percent consistent with price stability, one may wonder
whether a somewhat higher inflation rate is still in accordance with the mandate of the ECB.  More funda-4
mentally, the objective of price stability has different interpretations: price level constancy versus zero
inflation. Depending on which interpretation is chosen, monetary policy has to smooth out random shocks to the
price level or not. Fischer (1994) has shown that the objective of long-run price level constancy implies a
strategy for monetary policy that provides low uncertainty as regards the price level for the long run but
comparatively high uncertainty for the short run, while the objective of zero inflation yields lower price
level uncertainty for the short run but high and rising uncertainty for the long run. So, there is some room for
manoeuvre for the ECB with respect to the goals of monetary policy (De Haan, 1997). More fundamentally, it is
up to the ECB to decide under what circumstances policies, which support gene al economic policies in the
Community, impair the primary objective of price stability. In other words, the ECB has too much goal
independence.  Where a central bank has both instrument and goal independence the body charged with holding the5
central bank accountable is not provided with an effective statutory yardstick to evaluate the performance of
the bank, and thus to hold the bank accountable for its conduct of monetary policy.
 The choice of a single objective also simplifies the monitoring of central bank performance. As
Glastra (1997, p. 324-25) put it: "Performance control is facilitated, first, by the existence of one goal
rather than multiple ones (or by their unambiguous ranking), and secondly, by the existence of a clearly stated
and narrowly defined statutory goal. The announcement of a single goal (or a primary goal), rather than several
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unranked goals, enables authorities and public opinion to control perf rmance more effectively. It is easier
to control a narrowly defined target than a broadly defined objective...". The difficulties resulting from
multiple objectives may be avoided to some extent by the introduction of a clear hierarchy according to which
any secondary objectives may only be pursued as long as they do not conflict with the primary objective.
The statutes of many central banks are rather vague in terms of final objectives, or contain various
(possibly conflicting) objectives without giving indications as to their prioritization. For instance, the
Bundesbank has a prime objective (formally referred to as defence of the value of the currency) which is not
very specific. Even more vague is the objective of the Dutch Central Bank (to regulate the value of the Guilder
in a welfare enhancing way). The Federal Reserve System faces multiple objectives which may be conflicting.
According to section 2A (1) sentence 1 of the Federal Reserve Act: "The Board of Governors of the Fed and the
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and cre it aggregates commensu-
rate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable process, and moderate long-interest rates." Neither the Federal Reserve Act nor
any other law provides for any hierarchy. A good example of a clear prescription of objectives is the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand which has as its primary objective: the pursuit of price stability. The governor of the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand has to agree with the government a tight target range for inflation. In this so-
called Policy Target Agreement (PTA) the concept is clearly defined and a target range for the inflation rate
is provided. Such a contracting approach, as modelled for instance by Walsh (1995), is often c nsidered as a
way to achieve accountability.
The need for a clear monetary objective for a central bank is increasingly recognised. Goodhart
(1993, p. 4) is in favour of a quantified and statutory objective for containing inflation, arguing that the
term price stability is to vague: "It will always be possible for the Governor to say: "Well, we have lived in a
very difficult world, doing everything we can to achieve price stability".
Transparency is a very important element of accountability. As Glastra (1997, p. 323) puts it: "Accountability
requires that the central bank, at the very least explain and justify its policies or actions, and give account
for the decisions made in the execution of its responsibilities." Whatever other arrangements concerning
democratic accountability may exist, their scope is limited without transparency because information
concerning the behaviour of the central bank is crucial for the evaluation of its performance (see also
Demertzis et al., 1998). As Alan Greenspan put it: "In a democratic society all public policy making should be
in the open, except when such a forum impedes the primary function assigned to an institution."  6
The transparency of the central bank policy depends upon whether and to what extent decision-making
bodies of the bank are required to publish minutes of their meetings and/or the (reasoned) decisions they have
taken. Where the reasons for a certain monetary policy decision lay open and the proponents and opponents of a
particular decision become known it is easier to make a judgement and to hold central bank officials and, in
case of a participation on the monetary policy board of the bank, government officials accountable for their
behaviour. Moreover, a central bank should be required to report in regular intervals on its past performance
and future plans for monetary policy in accordance with the monetary objective. This is even more important
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where a clear monetary objective is missing because in such cases the central bank can only be judged on the
basis of its own statements. As follows from the citation from Greenspan, sometimes there may be sound policy
reasons not to reveal everything. Still, only those matters of policy-making should remain closed which are
really essential (one can think of interventions on exchange markets). To this end it would be useful if
explicit rules were provided for in the legal basis of a central bank laying down the conditions under which
minutes and decisions may be withheld. The envisaged new Bank of England Act sets a positive example in this
respect, as it regulates such conditions profoundly.
With respect to the final responsibility for monetary policy, we think that three issues are crucial: the
relationship with Parliament, the existence of some kind of override mechanism and the dismissal procedure for
the central bank governor.
The relationship between the central bank and Parliament has to play a major role in any evaluation of
the democratic accountability of the central bank itself. It has been argued that Parliament always holds the
ultimate responsibility for monetary policy since it can change the legal basis of the bank. Parliament's
legislative power can function as a mechanism of what the Roll Report in a broader context describes as ex ante
control whereby Parliament sets the rules with which the central bank must comply. Moreover, it can also in
principle function as a mechanism of ex post accountability because Parliament may decide to change the legal
basis of the bank as a reaction to a certain behaviour. A closer look reveals the diversity in the legislative
procedure applicable in the different constitutional systems. On the one hand, a difference between single and
dual chamber parliamentary systems can be observed. In parliamentary systems with two chambers the procedure
for amending the legal basis is more complex. Firstly, two chambers rather than one chamber will examine the
legislative proposal. Secondly, if the second chamber does not agree with the first chamber, the hurdles for
the legislation to be adopted are higher (see section 3 for more details).
The existence of some kind of override mechanisms has been described as a recognition of the
government's ultimate responsibility for monetary policy. However, in examining override mechanisms
attention has to be paid to the type of override mechanisms and the procedure for its application. Generally,
three types of override mechanisms can be distinguished, including (in descending order): the right to issue
instructions, the right to approve, suspend, annul or defer decisions, and the right to censor decisions on
legal grounds. Especially the first one may enhance the accountability. For instance, as long as the Bank Law
1948 has not been changed, the Minister of Finance has the right to give the Dutch central bank certain
instructions concerning the conduct of monetary policy. Whether he really uses this right is of limited
importance. If he does not, the Minister thereby implicitly approves of actual policy and is to this extent
accountable vis-à-vis Parliament. Similarly, the Reserve Bank Act 1989 gives the New Zealand Minister of
Finance the right through a so-called Order in Council the right to override the objective of price stability;
the Bank remains in charge of monetary policy but should aim for the objective as specified by the government.
This type of override mechanism is of a very different nature than e.g. the right of the German government to
suspend a decision of the governing council (Zentralbankrat) of the Bundesbank, since only the first gives the
government the power to really change monetary policy.  7
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The simple fact that government can override the central bank does not necessarily add to the
democratic accountability of monetary policy. Rather, the conditions under which an override mechanism can be
applied should be laid down in detail. The necessity for detailed provisions on the conditions under which the
central bank can be overridden increases with the seriousness of the override mechanism. Override mechanisms
can build a bridge between the central bank and the democratically elected institutions, i.e. parliament and
executive government. The override mechanism can function as a tool to hold the central bank accountable on a
continuous basis by providing the government with the possibility to intervene. However, at the same time it
has to be ensured that the mechanism is not used as a tool for undesired political influence by the executive
government. The procedure for the application for the override mechanism itself needs to be transparent. The
decision to apply the override mechanism should be made public. Furthermore, the procedure to apply an
override should provide for some kind of review (like a possibility for the central bank to appeal) to make
sure that the override is being used carefully.
The dismissal procedure can account to a mechanism of ex post accountability if a central bank
official can be dismissed on grounds of bad performance in terms of realising stated objectives.  Supporters of8
independent central banks emphasise the importance of long and non-renewable terms for central bank
officials. However, short tenure may enhance the accountability of the central banker vis-à-vis the appoin-
ting body by giving the latter a chance to review the track record of the former in regular and short intervals.
With respect to dismissal, the most important question is therefore whether and under what circumstances
central bank officials can be dismissed. Dismissal may function as a sanction for poor performance by linking
the tenure of central bank officials to policy results, i.e. meeting the predetermined monetary policy target.
This is the case for the Reserve Bank of New Zealand where t e PTA between the governor of the Bank and the
Minister of Finance lays down the policy targets which the former has to achieve. Inadequate performance can
result in the dismissal of the governor. In contrast, the president of the ECB can only be dismissed if he no
longer fulfills the general conditions required for his performance or in case of serious misconduct.
3. Accountability in the economics literature
Most of the literature on central banking focuses on central bank independence (see Eijffinger and De Haan,
1996 for a review). The basic set-up of this litera ure is the dynamic inconsistency problem of monetary policy
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977). When monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistency, policy outcomes are
suboptimal if the government cannot precommit: ex ante optimal plans are not credible because private sector
agents recognize the government's incentive to reoptimize later. Expectations will then be formed in
anticipation of this ex post incentive, thereby bringing the economy off the optimal path. 
We can illustrate this line of reasoning as follows. It is assumed that policy-makers seek to minimize
the following loss function:































where w>0 and k>1, whereas output is driven by a Lucas supply curve:
where B is inflation, B  is expected inflation, y  is output, y  is the natural output and u  is a random shock.e t n t
Policymakers minimize (1) on a period by period basis, taking the inflation expectations as given. This gives:
 
With rational expectations inflation turns out to be:
If policymakers were to follow a rule taking into account private rational expectational behaviour, inflation
would be:
As the same level of utput is realised in both cases, the latter outcome is clearly superior. No matter what
factors exactly cause the dynamic inconsistency problem , in all cases the resulting rate of inflation is sub-9
optimal. One possible solution to this problem is delegation of monetary policy. The idea is that the
government hands over the sole responsibility of policy conduct to an independent and "conservative" central
banker (Rogoff, 1985). However, institutional changes aimed at reducing possibilitie  of he central bank to
engage in discretionary policy, run the risk of producing suboptimal stabilization policies. So the task of
central bank design is to balance the need to limit the inflationary bias (to enhance credibility) with the
need to maintain sufficient flexibility for policymakers to respond to economic disturbances (stabilization).
Indeed, Rogoff (1985) shows that if monetary policy is set at the discretion of a conservative central banker,
a lower average time-consistent inflation rate will result.  However, while such central bankers will, in10
equilibrium, produce a lower inflation than does the government, stabilization of the real economy will in
this case be suboptimally low. Lohmann (1992) therefore agues that partial delegation of monetary policy
yields superior outcomes. She introduces the possibility to override the central banker at a strictly positive
but finite cost. Now government can choose: either ovride the central bank or accept monetary policy of the
central bank (see Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996 for further details). A real world example of such a construc-
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tion is the aforementioned possibility for the Dutch minister of Finance to override the central bank. 
It follows from the foregoing that there is a clear link with the third aspect of accountability as
exemplified in the previous section (decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary policy). In case
there is an override mechanism, government ultimately decides about monetary policy. Whether it uses the
override mechanism is of less relevance, since simply the possibility of such an override will influence the
behaviour of the central bank. This link with accountability is also present in an alternative line of research
which has "solved" the dynamic inconsistency problem by contracting (Persson and Tabellini, 1993; Walsh,
1995; Svensson, 1997). The idea is to let the principal of the central bank impose an explicit inflation target
for monetary policy and make the central banker explicitly accountable for his success in meeting this target.
Walsh has argued that an optimal linear inflation contract can eliminate the inflationary bias. The solution
is superior to Rogoff's solution as there is no effect on output variability.  However, this initial11
conclusion has been shown not to be robust. Introducing uncertainty in the simple inflationary bias model
partially restores the Rogoff (1985) result, i.e. the trade-off between credibility and stabilization
reappears. Relevant references here are Herrendorf and Lockwood (1998) and Svensson (1997).
Also this solution has been criticized by McCallum (1995). He argues that if government cannot commit
to the optimal penalty schedule before various types of nominal contra ts are concluded the optimal contract
will not be credible. Still, one response to this critique is that an institutional solution may be able `to
save society from itself' as contracts and targets are highly visible arrangements and the political costs for
a government reneging on them may be so high as to make them work (Muscatelli, 1997). 
In general, if the central bank is not always able to decide on monetary policy as governmnt is able
to interfere, this may enhance accountabilty and reduce independence. Still, on the basis of the foregoing
analysis, we would argue that on theoretical grounds this reduction in independence is welfare increasing. In
both the Lohman and Walsh models government (or parliament) ultimately bears the final responsibility for
monetary policy and this yields more superior outcomes in comparison to the situation where the central bank
bears ultimate responsibility. Also on empirical grounds, it can be argued that for the inflation performance
of central banks the issue of who bears the final responsibility for monetary policy is not crucial. Recently,
De Haan and Kooi (1997) have decomposed various indicators of central bank independence and they conclude that
in fact only instrument independence is related to the inflation performance in OECD countries. 
With respect to the ultimate objectives aspect of accountability there is no inherent trade-off
between accountability and independence. If the law stipulates that the objective of the central bank should
be price stability, the central bank, of course, no longer has goal independence. However, both in the
theoretical and empirical literature on central bank independence, this has been considered as positive. For
instance, in constructing his measure of central bank independence, Cukierman (1992) takes this issue into
account as follows. If the statute of a central bank defines price stability as the primary policy goal, the
central bank concerned gets a high score on this part of his index, since "in Rogoff's terminology, it measures
how strong is the "conservative bias" of the central bank as embodied in the law" (Cukierman, 1992, p. 377). 
One important reason that various authors argue that there is a trade-off between independence and
accountability has to do with the concept of a "conservative" central banker. From a practical point the
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concept of a "conservative" central banker seems void, if only since the preferences of possible candidates
for positions in the governing board of a central bank are generally not very easy to identify and may change
after they have been appointed. This uncertainty is crucial in a number of models, like that of Nolan and
Schaling (1996). Nolan and Schaling (1996) change the central bank's loss function (1) into: 
where x  is a random shock to the central bank's inflation stabilisation preferences. Defining accountabilityt
as a mechanism whereby agents' actions are made apparent to the principal, these authors argue that if agents
are unsure of how the central bank is going to act (i.e., there is uncertainty over the central bank's
inflation versus output stabilisation preferences) their expectations of inflation are less accurate than
they otherwise would be. Generally, it is likely that inflation expectations will be higher. It follows that
inflationary expectations may be reduced both by an increase in accountability (in the definition of Nolan and
Schaling), and/or an increase in the degree of central bank independence. For a given target level of inflation
the optimal degree of central bank accountability is higher the lower is the degr e of central bank independ-
ence. It will be clear, that the concept of accountability that Nolan and Schaling seem to have in mind is
rather different form ours. In fact, Nolan and Schaling seem to refer to what we have dubbed transparency. So
in section 5 we will analyse whether there is a trade-off between this aspect of accountability and central
bank independence. Before we turn to this issue, we first develop an indicator for accountability of central
banks, based on the approach as outlined in the previous section.
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4. An indicator for central bank accountability
In this section we will quantify the concept of accountability as outlined in the previous section. In line
with indices for central bank independence, our analysis is based on central bank laws. In other words, we take
the views of the legislator as our starting point.12
With respect to decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary policy we distinguish between the
following aspects:
 1. does the central bank law stipulate the objectives of monetary policy?
 2. is there a clear prioritization of objectives?
 3. are the objectives clearly defined?
 4. are the objectives quantified (in the law or based on document based on the law)?
As explained in the previous section, we think that the central bank law should provide the objec-
tive(s) of monetary policy. To be sure, from the point of view of democratic accountability it is secondary,
what the objective consists of. Thus, although in the majority view price stability is the favourable monetary
objective, it is not a pre-condition for an accountable central bank. Yet, the less a central bank is bound to
specific objectives the more difficult it becomes to evaluate the bank's performance, since a suitable
yardstick is missing. The evaluation of central bank performance is the central element of central bank
accountability and a clearly stated objective is therefore essential. It is also important that in case of
various objectives a clear prioritization is provided, since otherwise the central bank is still in a position
to decide upon the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. As follows from our discussion of the objective of
price stability, it also helps if the objective is clearly defined. The provision of quantified objectives -
e.g. a maximum inflation rate - may enhance accountability. For instance, in the case of New Zealand
politicians decide on the rate of inflation they consider to be acceptable ex ante. The electorate can then
decide - also on the basis of realised inflation rates - whether they agree with these policy choices. Very
often, however, these quantifications are missing. Article 1 (1) Bank Act 1993 of France states e.g. that: "The
bank shall formulate and implement monetary policy with the aim of ensuring price stability. It shall carry out
these duties within the framework of the Government's overall economic policy." The objective of price
stability is not closer defined in the Bank Act 1993, or any other law. Instead, the Bank itself quantifies the
objective of price stability in its Annual Report. Price ncreases, as measured by the consumer price index,
should not exceed 2%. 
With respect to the transparency of actual monetary policy we distinguish between the following aspects:
 5. must the central bank publish an inflation or monetary policy report of some kind, in addition to standard
central bank bulletins/report?
 6. are minutes of meetings of the governing board of the central bank made public within a reasonable time?
 7. must the central bank explain publicly to which extent it has been able to reach its objectives?
Our fifth aspect has been suggested by Briault et al. (1996). As they put it: "...these reveal
information on the authorities' reaction function - its actions, objectives and intentions - and thus on the
12
distribution of the authorities' inflation preference" (p. 34). In a similar vein, transparency will be
improved if the minutes of the governing council are publicly available. Of course, to be meaningful this
should not take thirty years as in Germany. The usefulness of publication of minutes depends on other
institutional arrangements. For instance, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand does not publish any minutes.
However, the reason for this is to be found in the institutional structure of the Bank, according to which
monetary policy decisions are effectively taken by the governor himself, rather than by a collegial body. The
legal basis of the ECB does not contain any provisions on the publication or even maintenance of minutes of the
meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB. Once again primary Community law leaves it for the ECB to decide
whether, to what extent, and under what conditions minutes of the meetings of the Government Board are
published. Under the proposed new Bank of England Act the obligation to publish minutes of the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) is included. According to this, the minutes will have to include the voting preferences of the
members of the MPC taking part in a particular meeting. However, one exception is planned, that is the
publication of the minutes of meetings relating to decisions to intervene in the financial markets. Minutes of
such meetings have to be published eventually, that is wi hin six weeks of the publication of the statement
about the decision to intervene.
Transparency will be improved if the monetary authorities have to explain the extent to which they
were able to reach the final objectives of monetary policy. Whether this obligation is prescribed in the law or
has another origin is less important, as long as it is clearly prescribed what the central bank is supposed to
do. The legal basis of the ECB/ESCB foresees the publication of reports on the activities of the ESCB on at
least a quarterly basis. Whether and to what extent they will include details on the past performance and
projections on the future development of monetary policy and/or self-proclaimed targets for monetary policy,
is left to the ECB to decide, as the Maastricht Treaty and ESCB Statute do not include any details on the
contents of these reports. The Fed does not publish regular monetary policy or inflation reports as such.
However, the Chairman of the Board of Governors is obliged to forward a report on its objectives and plans with
regard to the development of the monetary and credit aggregates twice a year. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Bank of England are obliged by law to publish reports on the development of monetary policy on a regular
basis. The New Zealand central bank is obliged to deliver a policy statement, which includes a review and
assessment of the implementation of monetary policy in the period subsequent to the previous statement and a
statement including the Bank's proposal for the imple entation of monetary policy with the goal of achieving
price stability for the succeeding 5 years.  Similar to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of England13
publishes a monetary policy report in the form of an inflation report, which not only assesses the past
developments, but includes an outlook concerning the development of inflation. 
With respect to the final responsibility for monetary policy we distinguish between the following aspects:
 8. is the central bank subject to monitoring by Parliament (is there a requirement - apart from an annual
report - to report to Parliament and/or explain policy actions in Parliament)?
 9. has the government (or Parliament ) the right to give instructions?14
10. is there some kind of review in the procedure to apply the override mechanism?
13
11. has the central bank possibility for an appeal in case of an instruction?
12. can the central bank law be changed by a simple majority in Parliament?
13. is past performance a ground for dismissal of a central bank governor?
Question 8 has been suggested by Briault et al. (1995). Indeed, while the transparent conduct of
monetary policy supports Parliament in its decision-making process about the performance of the bank,
institutionalised contacts support the overall transparency of monetary policy. Parliament has the
opportunity to review the performance of the central bank with regard to monetary policy on a regular basis,
while the central bank at the same time can explain and justify its conduct. These contacts have to be foreseen
in the legal basis of the central bank.
The importance of an override mechanism has also been suggested by Briault et al. However, her  we
follow a somewhat different approach as we consider only government's right to give instructions in certain
(well defined) circumstances to be relevant for accountability. Furthermore, as explained in the previous
section, it is important whether some kind of review procedure is part and parcel of the override mechanism.
The possibility of the central bank to appeal should be part of this procedure. 
Question 12 is included since we believe it is important that Parliament should be able to change the
central bank law. Indeed, it has been argued that the mere threat of a change of the law will ensure that even
independent central banks (like the Bundesbank) will ensure that monetary policy will in general be in
accordance with the wishes of elected politicians (Gormley and De Haan, 1996). There are, however, some cases
in which the power of Parliament may be restricted somewhat. In the US, for instance, the President has the
power to veto a change, in which case a two third majority in Congress is required to change the law.  Still,15
for the ECB the power of Parliaments is much less as a change would require amendment of primary Community law,
which implies that all countries have to agree.
Finally, as argued in the previous section we think that if past performance is a ground for dismissal
this may enhance accountability.
In constructing our indicator we simply add the number of positive answers on all the aspects that we have
distinguished. This implies of course that we think that the aspect of the final responsibility is most
important. The answers to the questions relate to the laws as prevalent in 1997. A special situation arises in
this respect for the UK. With the change of government in 1997 the new Labour government has announced major
institutional changes to grant the Bank of England more independence in the implementation of monetary policy
while at the same time ensuring the accountability of the Bank. It has been agreed upon between the executive
government and the Bank of England that these new arrangements which have been announced by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer operate d facto until the proposed bill has been accepted by Parliament. Therefore, we have used
the proposed new Act as the relevant basis for the UK. Table 1 provides our assessment of the accountability of
16 central banks at the time of writing.   16
It is shown by this index that the ECB has a low degre  of democratic accountability.  The assessment17
of the Bank of England, which is based on the proposed new legislation, shows, that the envisaged reforms
provide for a high degree of accountability of the Bank. In fact the envisaged arrangements provide for a
14



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Tabel 1 An indicator for central bank accountability
16
5. Independence and accountability
As outlined in the introduction, nowadays it is widely believed that central bank independence may foster
price stability. However, as Issing (1998, p. 4) points out: "The independence of a central ba k is not an end
in itself but only a means of achieving an objective set by the legislature. The associated purpose-orientied
transfer of responsibility implies that the central bank is to be held accountable for its decisions. In
particular, it has to disclose and justify the progress it has made in attaining its final goal, its monetary
policy strategy, and its ongoing monetary policy measures." How well do independent central banks score in
this respect? In answering this question, we have updated one indicator for CBI and compare it with our
indicator for central bank accountability.
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995) have constructed an index for CBI
which is based on three issues: the location of the final responsibility for monetary policy, the absence or
presence of a government official on the board of the central bank and the fraction of board appointees made by
government. To be more precise, they ask the following questions:
 1. is the bank the sole final policy authority; is this authority not entrusted to the central bank
alone, or is it entrusted completely to the government?
 2. is there no government official (with or without voting power) on the bank policy board?
 3. are more than half of the policy board appointments made independently of the government?
If the central bank has the sole responsibility for monetary policy, a country gets a double score. In case of
joint responsibility, it gets a normal score, and if only government is responsible, it gets no score. In case
of an affirmative answer to questions 2 and 3, a country receives a normal score. Eijffinger and Schaling add
one to the total score so that the least independent central bank gets a score of one, and the most independent
bank receives a score of five.
Table 3 shows the updated indicator. As various central bank laws have been changed over the last
years, it is important that our indicator for central bank accountability and the indicator for CBI refer to
the same moment. Indeed, previous comparisons of accountability and CBI can be criticized on this account.18
Figures 1-3 shows the relationship between the various aspects of accountability and the updated
indicator of CBI. Table 2 shows the regressions. It follows that there appears a negative relationship between
CBI and two aspects of accountability, albeit that the relationship between CBI and transparency is a weak one.


























































































































































Tabel 2The updated Eijffinger-Schaling indicator for central bank independence
18
Table 3. Simple regressions between CBI and aspects of accountability
Aspect of accountability: Constant: Accountability: R  (adj.)2
Objectives 2.71 (5.44) 0.29 (1.23) 0.03
Transparency 3.92 (8.16) -0.58 (-1.92) 0.15
Final responsibility 5.11 (10.47) -0.70 (-4.38) 0.55
Total 4.50 (5.90) -0.23 (-1.86) 0.14




Most politicians in Europe nowadays seem to be convinced that the future ECB should be very independent.
Indeed, there are compelling reasons for this view (De Haan, 1997). Still, as follows from the citation of
Stiglitz at the beginning of this paper, this does not mean that central bank accountability can be neglected.
Democratic accountability should not necessarily be regarded as a restrictive mechanism limiting the
independent position of the central bank but, on the contrary, can be seen as a validating mechanism
legitimising the independent position of a central bank.  Thus, the relationship between central bank19
independence and democratic accountability is characterised not primarily by a trade-off between the two
principles. A central bank with a proper accountability mechanism is not simply a central bank which has been
stripped of its independence (central bank accountability = the reciproke of central bank independence).
Although some aspects of accountability may interfere with central bank independence, the concepts are
definitely not adversaries. Indeed, as the Roll-report already put it a central bank should be independent and
accountable. 
It follows from our analysis that based on the Maastricht Treaty the accountability of the ECB is
poorly arranged for. As pointed out, however, central bank laws sometimes off r pportunities to enhance the
accountability by going further than the requirements as prescribed in the law. So how could the accountabil-
ity of the ECB be strengthened? It is clear that the ECB scores relatively high with respect to the ultimate
objectives of monetary policy. The only improvement in terms of accountability would be to define price
stability formally and explicitly as an inflation rate (CPI) between 0 and 2%. Indeed, the EMI, in its report
on the elements of the monetary policy strategy of the ESCB, has recommended this, stating that "there has been
a broad consensus among central banks for seve al years that a range of 0%-2% inflation per annum would be
appropriate" (EMI, 1997, p. 12).
As it will prove difficult - if not impossible - to change the regulations with respect to the final
responsibility of monetary policy, the main improvements of the accountability of the ECB can be found with
respect to the transparency of actual monetary policy. The future president of the ECB already announced that
he will publicly explain to which extent the ECB has been able to r ach its objectives within the context of
hearing before the European Parliament. The publication of an inflation or monetary policy report and/or the
minutes of meetings of the governing board of the ECB could also strengthen the accountability of the central
bank. A monetary policy report would certainly contribute to the transparency of actual monetary policy. This
could be published quarterly as a upplement to the annual report of the ECB. The EMI (1997, p. 12) has
indicated that "the ECB should publicly set targets against which its performance can be assessed and explain
its policy action to the public with reference to its targets". The intermediate target of the ECB has yet to be
defined. It will be announced publicly, whether as a monetary aggregate or an inflation forecast implicit in
the direct inflation targeting strategy. It is foreseen that the ECB should not only announce the target and
the details of its calculation, but should also "regularly publish the data and analysis relevant to monetary
policy, as well as explanations of the deviation from the target and the policy response of the central bank
(EMI, 1997, p. 16). 
21
The publication of the minutes of meeting of the ECB-council is a more sensitive issue. The Maastricht
Treaty forbids the ECB from publishing the detailed minutes and votes, as article 10.4 of the Statutes states:
"The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential. The Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of
its deliberations public". Still, minutes of the meetings of the Governing Board of the ECB could take a
similar form as the minutes of the FOMC meetings of the Fed. Only the outcome of the decision, not the procedure
for reaching the decisions, can be made public, thereby stressing that the ECB as a whole should be held
accountable, not each of the individuals of its decision-making body (see also Bini Smaghi, 1998).
These published minutes then are not detailed transcripts of the meetings including the voting behaviour and
names of the members of the ECB-council, but should contain the monetary policy stance (restrictive, neutral
or expansionary) and the arguments put forward by the members.
22
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1. For a general critique we refer to McCallum (1995), Posen (1995) and Forder (1996). 
2. See also Gormley and De Haan (1996) and Goodhart (1997) for a critical assessment of the accountabili-
ty of the ECB.
3. Additionally, Nolan and Schaling use indicators for CBI and ccountability which are constructed for
different periods as they do not use updated indicators for CBI. The same holds true for De Haan
(1997).
4. The EMI (1997, p. 12) states: "While theory does not provide a pr cise definition of price stability
and while measurement problems exist, there has been a broad consensus among central banks for
several years that a range of 0%-2% inflation per annum would be appropriate." 
5. Goodhart (1997, p. 168) goes even a step further by arguing that "Perhaps the main point is not so much
that the ECB with its present goal independence, has a democratic deficit, but rather that the federal
institutions of the European Union taken as a whole have such a democratic deficit."
6. A. Greenspan, Statement before the Committee on banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, October 13, 1993, 1100-1107, at 1005.
7. At the time of the establishment of the ESCB, override mechanisms in the statutes of the Member States
central banks participating in EMU will be considered in contradiction with the EC Treaty, Articles
107 and 108 EC, and the ESCB Statute. Therefore, the legal bases of the national central banks
participating in the ESCB are no longer allowed to include any provisions referring to override
mechanisms. 
8. The appointment of central bank officials may be considered less important for the democratic
accountability. It can be argued that it amounts to an ex ante mechanism of control by choosing the
persons entrusted with the power over monetary policy. Yet, the appointment of central bank officials
may be better described as a mechanism of democratic legitimation rather than accountability.
9. One consideration would be the lower unemployment rate resulting from a monetary surprise. Other
sources of the time inconsistency problem originate with the public finances. The dynamic inconsis-
tency of monetary policy may first arise, bcause the incentives for the government to inflate change
before and after the public has settled for a nominal interest rate, taking into account its expected
rate of inflation. Before the public commits itself, the central bank has an incentive to abstain from
making inflation. After positions in government bonds have been taken, policymakers have an incentive
to create inflation. Another source of the inconsistency problem also originates in the finances of
government and may be referred to as the `revenue' or `seigniorage' motive for monetary expansion.
The dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy arises here, because incentives for the government to
inflate change before and after the public has chosen the level of real money balances. 
10. This approach has been criticized by McCallum (1995), as delegation does not resolve the dynamic
inconsistency, it merely relocates it as government has the power to appoint a new central banker.
Implicit in the models of those in favour of an independent and "conservative" central banker is that
monetary delegation is not that easily changed: delegation is either binding or there are prohibitive
costs in changing delegation. Recently, Jensen (1997) has shown that delegation with "reappointment
costs" to some extent reduces the dynamic inconsistency. Only in the special case where costs are all
Notes
26
that matter for the government is the dynamic inconsistency resolved completely. An interesting
result is that a government which suffers a credibility problem will gain by monetary delegation. 
11. However, Svensson (1997) emphasizes that the trade-off between inflation and output variability in
the Rogoff-model follows from a particular specification of preferences. If the central bank has a
lower average inflation target than society rather than an increased weight on inflation stabiliza-
tion, average inflation can be reduced without increasing output variability. So, provided the bank
is given a suboptimally low inflation target to aim for, the outcome is isomorphic to a Walsh-
contract. This implies that the socially optimal level of welfare can be achieved through delegation
of authority to a central banker with a suitable desired level of inflation rather than via an
incentive contract for the bank. It would appear, therefore, that Svensson's result implies that it
is possible to reach the social optimum simply by delegating authority to an appropriately chosen
type of central banker.
12. This is not say, however, that only laws determine actual central bank accountability. Indeed,
sometimes a central bank may be more accountable than can be inferred from the law. This may be true
for the ECB as well (Bini Smaghi, 1998). We will come back to this issue in section 6.
13. From March 1998 onwards, Monetary Policy Statements will be issued in quarterly intervals. 
14. In Sweden parliament may give instructions.
15. In Germany a simple majority in the Bundestag may not be enough. If the Bundesrat maintains objections
against the existing legislative proposal, the Bundestag can pass the legislation without the consent
of the Bundesrat, if the proposed legislation constitutes a Zustimmungsgesetz. Since, according to
most commentators, this is the case for the legal basis of the Bundesbank, the Bundestag can pass
legislation on the Bundesbank - if necessary - without the consent of the Bundesrat. However, if the
Bundesrat has rejected the proposal by a two-third majority the decision can oly be overruled by a
two-third majority of the votes of the Bundestag.
16. As pointed out before, our index of accountability is not the first. Briault et al. (1996) were the
first to construct such an indicator. Their index is based on four criteria: (a) whether the central
bank is subject to external monitoring by Parliament; (b) whether the minutes of meetings to decide
the setting of monetary policy are published; (c) whether the central bank publishes an inflation or
monetary policy report of some kind, in addition to standard central bank bulletins; and (d) whether
there is a clause that allows the central bank to be overridden in the event of certain shocks. If the
central bank law mentions an explicit escape clause a country receives a numerical value of 2.0. If
overriding the central bank is not a a priori excluded they assigned a value of 1.0. Finally, if no
provision exists they assigned 0. The other cha acteristics are simply given zero/unity values, and
added to a base level of one. Our index is more refined and derived from an explicit definition of
accountability.
17. It may seem odd in the view of some r aders that we have given the ECB a negative score on question 8
(monitoring by Parliament) although a provision exists on appearances by the President of the ECB
before the European Parliament, whereas both in the case of New Zealand and the UK we give a positive
score, although no provision exists in the legal bases of the banks. In the latter cases the obligati-
on to appear is based on constitutional convention (Amtenbrink, 1998). With regard to the ECB the
provision is - apart from presentation of the Annual Report - not binding.
18. In comparison to the previously published indicators, the scores for France and the UK have been
updated.
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19. Indeed, Bini Smaghi (1998, p. 4) states: "Accountability can thus be seen as a complement, if not a
necessary requirement, for independence: a central bank cannot be made independent if its objectives
are not clearly and precisely defined; it cannot remain independent if it does not give account of its
actions with a view to its pre-specified objectives."
